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The Greylord Investigation Guidelines:
Protection for Greylord Attorneys?
INTRODUCTION

During the embryonic stages of Operation Greylord' those planning the investigation decided that its success would require the
use of undercover techniques in the courtroom. 2 While these planners were concerned with possible violations of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"), 3 they reasoned that
their actions could be justified under existing ethical regulations.'
This reasoning soon was complicated, however, by In re Friedman,5 an Illinois Supreme Court case decided during the planning
1. Operation Greylord was a three and one-half year undercover investigation of corruption in the Cook County court system conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and the Cook County
State's Attorney. The investigation included, among other things, the creation of more
than seventy "fake" criminal cases, the wiretapping of one state judge's chambers, and
the undercover help of one judge who was wired for sound. To date, twenty-one Greyload defendants have been convicted of charges steming from the investigation, including
four judges. Charges are pending against five others. LeFevour Conviction a Boost for
Prosecutors, Chicago Daily Bulletin, July 15, 1985, at 1, col.2. See also Greylord's Uneasy Fallout, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1984 at 35; The Judge Who Wore a Wire, A.B.A. J., Feb.
1984 at 76; The Big Fix Inside Greylord, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 3, 1985, at 1, col. 3;
Greylord Figure Pleads Guilty, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 26, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
2. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. On August 2, 1983, the American
Bar Association ("ABA") adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") in place of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") which
had been adopted in 1969. Few states, however, have adopted the Model Rules. See T.
MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY 28 (3d ed. 1984). Since the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility ("Illinois
Code") is still based upon the Model Code, see infra note 40, and because Illinois is the
jurisdiction focused upon in this note, the Model Rules will not be addressed here. It
should be sufficient to say that like the Model Code, the Model Rules do not have a goodmotive exception. See generally infra note 43. Three of the four Model Code sections
dealt with in this note, see infra note 42 and accompanying text, have corresponding
sections in the Model Rules. They are:
Model Code
DR I-102(A)(4)
DR 7-102(A)(4)
DR 7-102(A)(6)

Model Rules
Rules 3.3(a)(1), (2), & (4),
3.4(a), (b), 8.4(c) & (B)
Rules 3.3(a), (c), 4.1
Rules 1.2(d), 3.4(b)

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ("MODEL RULES"), Table B (1983).
4. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.

5.

76 Ill. 2d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979).
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stages of Operation Greylord. Friedman addressed the issue of
whether the use of undercover techniques in the courtroom could
be justified, or whether this use violated the Model Code regardless
of motivation. 6
As a result of Friedman, the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of Illinois at the time,7 developed six guidelines
to be used in the Greylord investigation.8 The guidelines were
meant to address the difficulties of using undercover techniques in
the courtroom without violating the Model Code. 9 The guidelines
were also meant to prevent Model Code violations when Greylord
attorneys used undercover techniques in court.10
This note briefly will sketch the use of undercover techniques by
government law enforcement officers and the reaction of the courts
to these methods. Then, it will discuss possible Model Code violations resulting from the use of these techniques in the courtroom.
Next, the note will analyze the Greylord investigation guidelines in
light of Friedman and demonstrate that the guidelines fail to prevent violations of the Model Code. Finally, this note will explain
how undercover techniques could be used in court without violating the Model Code and how a form of the Greylord Guidelines
could be useful in attaining this end.
BACKGROUND

Evidence-gathering techniques, such as ruses" which include the
involvement of government agents in criminal activities, are acceptable law enforcement techniques today. 2 This is because in
6. See infra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
7. The United States Attorney from 1977-1981 was Mr. Thomas Sullivan.
8. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
10. Id.
11. Mr. Sullivan used the word "ruse" to describe undercover investigative techniques, in his lecture at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law on March 15, 1984;
see 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 99, 100 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan Lecture].
12. Undercover investigations were recognized as a legitimate evidence-gathering
technique by the Supreme Court over fifty years ago in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928). The Court in Olmstead, in holding that such techniques were valid,
relied upon the long history of criminal cases "where officers of the law have disguised
themselves. . . and given themselves every appearance of active members engaged in the
promotion of crime, for the purpose of securing evidence. Evidence secured by such
means has always been received." Id. at 468; see also Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 441 (1983) ("Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises.").
These techniques are acceptable at least insofar as the courts are now unable, and the
legislature has not chosen, to control and regulate such activities. See United States v.
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many instances, law enforcement officers lack the requisite intent
to be convicted for criminal conduct. 3 Accordingly, many states
have enacted "justification" statutes that allow this type of
conduct.'
Governmental involvement in crime for law enforcement purposes, however, has not always been accepted to the extent that it
is today. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, the United States
Supreme Court debated whether to allow this involvement by the
government without an accompanying penalty.' 5 The Court considered denying the government the use of the courts in such a
situation, reasoning by analogy that the government was attemptLau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d 209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 359 (1983). See infra note
35 regarding recent legislative scrutiny of such activities.
13. A case in which this issue was raised but not relied upon by the court is Baucom
v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346 (1 lth Cir. 1982) wherein the facts show a fine example of the
trickster tricked.
14. For example, the New York "justification" statute states:
[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not
criminal when . . . [s]uch conduct is required or authorized by law or by a
judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of
his official powers, duties or functions.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975). The Practice Commentaries to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 explain that this statute "was designed to exempt peace officers and
other public servants from criminal liability for conduct reasonably performed by them in
the course of their duties . . . such as possession of narcotics, policy slips, and tear
gas ..
" Hechtman, Practice Commentaries to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney
1975). At least 18 states in addition to New York have similar statutes. See ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-503 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-701 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a17 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 704.11 (1979); GA. CODE § 26-901(b) (1978); HAWAIl REV. STAT. § 703-307 (1976); IOWA CODE § 411 (West 1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 503.040 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.18(1) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17a § 102 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627.5 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.105-02 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.05(c)(2) (Page Supp. 1973); OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.195 (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 504 (Purdon 1973); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 9.21 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401(2) (1978); WIS. STAT.
§ 939.45 (1979).
See also Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66
MINN. L. REV. 567, 575 n.57 (1982).
Illinois does not have a "justification" statute, although it does have a "necessity" statute which provides:
Conduct which would otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused was without blame in occasioning or developing the situation
and reasonably believed such conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private
injury greater than the injury which might reasonably result from his own
conduct.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 7-13 (1977).
See generally Note, Refusal to Discipline Deceitful Illinois Prosecutor-Inre Friedman,
29 DE PAUL L. REV. 657 (1980).
15. Two cases in which the Supreme Court encountered government use of undercover techniques prior to the adoption of the entrapment defense were Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928).
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ing to use the equity courts with unclean hands.' 6 This reasoning,
however, was rejected as the Court began to acknowledge the need
for law enforcement methods that required governmental agents to
be involved in criminal activity. 17 As a result, the Supreme Court
began to follow the path taken by the lower federal courts by allowing governmental involvement in crime but recognizing the defense of entrapment.'" In this way, the Supreme Court allowed the
government to implement more effective law enforcement techniques, yet it reserved the right to limit or control these methods. 19
The entrapment defense, as originally formulated, focused upon
both the conduct of the government and the conduct of the accused. 20 The defense was successful if the accused could establish
that he was not predisposed to commit the crime and show that the
government agents were primarily responsible for the crime due to
their own involvement in the criminal activities. 2' If these two ele16. According to Justice Brandeis, not only would the "unclean hands" argument be
a valid defense for the defendant, the issue could and would be made sua sponte. Olinstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
18. The defense of entrapment was unknown at common law and was not recognized
as a substantive defense by the United States Supreme Court until 1932 in Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 455 (1932). See DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal
Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 243, 244 (1967); see
also Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Court, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 246
(1942).
Entrapment was recognized as a defense in the lower federal courts as early as 1915 in
Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). The defense was discussed even
earlier in United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (E.D. Mo. 1878); see also Gershman,
supra note 14, at 567, 582 n.85.
19. Undercover techniques were originally used "to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses..." Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932). These techniques are
most often used to combat "contraband offenses. . . which are so difficult to detect in
the absence of undercover government involvement." Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484, 495 n.7, (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 432 (1972); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 676 (2d Cir. 1973).
That the defense is meant to limit or control the use of undercover investigative techniques is evident in Sorrells: "The defense is available, not in the view that the accused
though guilty may go free, but that the government cannot be permitted to contend that
he is guilty of a crime where the government officials are the instigators of his conduct."
Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452.
20. The Sorrells Court, with regard to the defense of entrapment, noted: "The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant. But the. . . controlling question [of the entrapment defense is] whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent
whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of
the creative activity of its own officials." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451. Compare the Sorrells
Court's view of the entrapment defense with Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Sorrells
in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1972), infra note 23.
21. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
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ments were shown, the accused would not be convicted of the
crime.22
Today, however, the extent of the government's involvement in
criminal activities is no longer relevant to the entrapment defense.23 In order for the entrapment defense to be successful today,
the accused must establish that he was not predisposed to commit
the crime; he cannot bring the government's own conduct into issue in his defense. 24 Consequently, the courts can no longer employ the entrapment defense as a means of controlling or limiting
the methods by which governmental law enforcement agents obtain evidence. 25
Whether the court can penalize the government for its outrageous conduct in connection with its investigation of illegal activity, by barring prosecution or by other means, is presently a

controversial topic. 26 The controversy centers around the claim

22. Id. at 452.
23. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Russell, held that the sole focus of the
entrapment defense is the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1972). To support this holding, Justice Rehnquist
stated: "This Court's opinion in Sorrells v. United States . . . and Sherman v. United
States. . . held that the principal element in the defense of entrapment was the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime." Id. at 433. In Hampton v. United States, 425
U.S. 484 (1975), Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Court, in Russell, had "ruled out
the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon government misconduct in a case. . . where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime was
established." Id. at 488-89.
For a good overview of the development of the entrapment defense see Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976); see also Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts: Emergence of a Legal Doctrine, 47 Miss. L. J. 211
(1976). See generally Defeo, supra note 18; Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the
Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (1942); Sagarin & MacNamara, The Problem of
Entrapment, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 363 (1970); Schecter, Police Procedureand the Accusatorial Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 521 (1967); Williams, The Defense of Entrapment
and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959).
24. See supra note 23.
25.

See supra note 23.

26. In Russell, Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court might "some day be presented
with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due
process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1972). Lower courts
have used this language to release defendants based upon the conduct of government law
enforcement agents. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) (where
the government set up the drug laboratory and supplied the necessary chemical ingredients, prosecution of the defendants who played only a minor role as financial backers was
barred as a matter of due process of law); People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d
78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978) (coercion upon heavy drug user which consisted of physical
force and threat of prosecution in order to obtain his cooperation in undercover activities
held to be outrageous). The due process defense may have been narrowed considerably
since Russell. In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), Justice Rehnquist re-
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that, regardless of the defendant's predisposition, the conduct of
the governmental law enforcement agents violated the defendant's
due process rights. 27 Although a few courts have found the government's conduct to be outrageous in certain situations, the due
process claim rarely succeeds. Even when it does, the various
courts' definitions of "outrageous" differ considerably.28
With the absence of any significant controls on the government's
conduct, the use of undercover techniques has expanded to include
many types of secret crimes,19 especially to the so-called victimless
white collar crimes
and crimes of corruption in all three branches
of government.3 Along with the increased use of undercover techversed his stated position in Russell declaring that due process is only a factor if the
government conduct violated a protected right of the defendant. The defendant could not
seek release based solely on the conduct of the government, no matter how outrageous or
shocking. Id. at 490. Although Justice Rehnquist wrote the lead opinion, it is not clear
whether a majority of the Court agreed with him on this point. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at
493 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
The narrowness of the due process aspect of the entrapment defense and of the entrapment defense generally is evidenced by the four major opinions which have resulted from
the Abscam investigation. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.) cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983) (government conduct in Abscam investigation did not reach
the level of outrageousness which would bar prosecution of defendant congressman on
various bribery charges despite the investigation's reliance upon a convicted swindler to
identify and attract targets to whom legitimate as well as illegitimate inducement were
offered); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524
(1983) (United States Senator's conviction on bribery charges upheld after court determined that government conduct in the investigation was not so outrageous as to violate
due process); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2438 (1983) (government involvement in Abscam was not so excessive as to violate due
process and thus bar the conviction of Congressman Myers); United States v. Jannotti,
673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (since the
amounts of the bribes were not so great as to negate the evidence of predisposition as a
matter of law, the bribes could not be so overreaching as to violate the due process clause
and bar the prosecution of the defendants).
The effect of Abscam upon the entrapment defense has been well documented. See
Gershman, Abscam, The Judiciary and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565
(1982); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Entrapment and Due Process of Law-the Efficiency
of Abscam Type Operations 5 CAM. L. REv. 377 (1983); Note, Entrapment as a Due
Process Defense: Developments After Hampton v. United States, 57 IND. L.J. 89 (1982).
27. Justice Rehnquist defined "outrageous" in Russell (see supra note 26) as conduct
which ". . . violat[es] that fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice." Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361
U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). Lower courts have differed as to what conduct they consider to be
fundamentally unfair or shocking to a universal sense of justice. See supra note 26.
28. See supra notes 26-27.
29. See supra note 19. The four Supreme Court cases which have dealt with the
entrapment defense all have involved contraband offenses. Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484 (1976) (narcotics); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (narcotics);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958) (narcotics); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435 (1932) (alcohol).
30. Baucom v. Martin, 677 F.2d 1346 (1lth Cir. 1982) (executive branch: under-
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niques, however, has come the potential for abuse.3 ' Specifically,
there is the danger that government overreaching will either injure
innocent citizens or create crime where there otherwise was none. 32
These concerns have recently become the subject of
judicial scru35
tiny, 33 scholarly comment, 34 and legislative action.
cover bribery attempt of allegedly corrupt Georgia state prosecutor); United States v.
Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982) (legislature: Philadelphia city council member convicted of accepting bribe from undercover FBI agents in
Abscam investigation); Nigrone v. Murtagh, 46 A.D.2d 343, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1974),
affTd, 36 N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975) (judiciary: United States
Customs Court judge allegedly perjured himself in undercover investigation of corruption
in New York criminal justice system).
31. See infra notes 33-35. For an in-depth examination and analysis of the problems
which can arise from the uncontrolled use of undercover techniques see ABSCAM ETHICS:
MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (G. Caplan ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as ABSCAM ETHICS].
32. Id.; see also infra notes 33-35.
33. In the judiciary, the famous words of Justice Brandeis are still the mainstay of
those opposing the use of undercover techniques by law enforcement officials:
The court's aid is denied only when he who seeks it has violated the law in
connection with the very transaction as to which he seeks legal redress. Then
aid is denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to maintain
respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the administration of justice;
in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination ...
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Two cases which have quoted Justice Brandeis are United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d
670, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1973) and In re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392, 397-98, 392 N.E.2d 1333,
1335-36 (1979). In Archer, Judge Friendly added some strong language of his own:
[T]here is certainly a limit to allowing governmental involvement in crime ...
Governmental investigation involving participation in activities that result in
injury to the rights of its citizens is a course that courts should be extremely
reluctant to sanction. Prosecutors and their agents naturally tend to assign
great weight to the societal interest in apprehending and convicting criminals;
the danger is that they will assign too little to the rights of citizens to be free
from government induced criminality.
Archer, 486 F.2d at 676-77 (footnote omitted).
34. The absence of any controls to check the uninhibited use of undercover investigative techniques worries even the staunchest supporters of these techniques. "This result
[of allowing due process controls] is necessary to guard adequately against government
overreaching." Gersham, supra note 14, at 605; see also ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 31.
35. The United States Senate recently formed a special committee to examine these
undercover techniques. The committee's findings identify many problems with these
techniques and propose some solutions. This excerpt is taken from the committee's
summary:
The Select Committee also finds that use of the undercover techniques creates
serious risks to citizens' property, privacy, and civil liberties, and may compromise law enforcement itself. Even when used by law enforcement officials with
the most honorable motives and the greatest integrity, the undercover techniques may on occasion create crime where none would otherwise have existed.
It may lead a government agent to offer an illegal inducement to a person who
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Of particular significance is the expanded use of these techniques
in the courtroom.36 This practice potentially violates provisions of
the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"). 37 The Model Code is a compilation
of the norms of conduct and ethical rules which govern the conduct of the legal profession. 38 The Model Code consists of Ethical
Consideration ("EC's"), which are aspirational goals toward which
all lawyers should strive, and Disciplinary Rules ("DR's"), which
set the levels of conduct beneath which a lawyer cannot fall without being subject to disciplinary action.39 Illinois courts, prior to
the legislative adoption of Illinois' Code of Professional Responsihas never previously committed a crime and who is not predisposed to do so;
cause innocent persons to suffer harm to their reputations or to their property;
undermine legitimate expectations of privacy; subject law enforcement agents to
unaccustomed temptations, dangers, and stresses; undermine the cohesiveness,
effectiveness and value of civic and political organizations; and create an atmosphere of distrust, in which public officials and private citizens must act with
some concern for the possibility that colleagues and acquaintances are not who
they seem to be, but are agents or informers of the federal, state, or local government. These dangers assume even more importance in undercover operations managed or conducted by agents or officials whose zeal, ambition, or baser
motives distort their judgment about the proper role of law enforcement in a
democratic society.
Accordingly, the Select Committee finds that the central task of those who
recognize both the efficacy and the danger of the undercover technique is to
create a system of statutes, guidelines, and rules that, avoiding both the tyranny
of unchecked crime and the tyranny of unchecked government intrusion, provide the public with the optimal balance between effective law enforcement and
the preservation and nurturing of civil liberties.
FinalReport of the Select Committee to Study UndercoverActivities of the Department of
Justice, S. REP. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee on UndercoverActivities]; see also FBI Undercover Guidelines: Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
36. The unique nature of the courtroom in this situation was commented upon in In
re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392, 395, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (1979). Neither the parties nor
the court were able to uncover any analogous cases which had previously been considered
by either a court or disciplinary committee.
Commentators have also noted the unique situation presented in Friedman Greylord's
Uneasy Fallout,supra note 1, at 37; Judge Who Wore a Wire, supra note 1, at 78. In his
lecture, Thomas Sullivan also commented upon the special problems which arise when
undercover techniques are used in the courtroom:
When the investigation involves the court system, as this one did, unique
problems are involved because the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits misleading the court by submitting perjured testimony or false
evidence.
Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 437.
37. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
38. MODEL CODE preamble and preliminary statement (1981).
39. Id.
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bility in 1980, ("Illinois Code"), based much of its disciplinary action on the Model Code.'
The sections of the Illinois and Model Codes potentially violated
by the employment of undercover techniques in the courtroom are
identical."' These sections are: DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct which
involves dishonesty or deceit); DR 7-102(A)(4) (use of perjured
testimony); DR 7-102(A)(6) (creation of false evidence); and DR
7-109(B) (the secreting of witnesses).42 Neither the Model Code
nor the Illinois Code contains a good-motive exception for technical violations of these sections. 43 Consequently, while these potential Code violations do not prevent the criminal conviction of the
targets of the undercover investigation they do provide a basis for
disciplining the attorney regardless of his good motive. 44 Whether
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, art. VIII (1983) (Committee Commentary, Preface).
Before 1980, the Illinois Supreme Court had not formally adopted the Model Code but
often used it as a guide for standards of professional conduct.. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at
396, 392 N.E.2d at 1335.
In June 1980, the Illinois Supreme Court officially adopted the Illinois Code, effective
July 1, 1980. The Illinois Code consists only of the DR's of the Model Code. The differences between the DR's in the Illinois Code and the DR's in the Model Code are minimal, and with regard to the DR's mentioned in this note, they are exactly the same. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, art. VIII (1983) (Committee Commentary, Preface).
41. See supra note 40.
42. The full text of these rules provides: DR I-102(A)(4) ("A lawyer shall not engage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); DR 7-102(A)(4)
("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly use perjured testimony or
false evidence"); DR 7-102(A)(6) ("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or when it is obvious that the evidence is false"); DR 7-109(B) ("A lawyer shall not advise or cause a
person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of
making him unavailable as a witness therein"). ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, art. VIII
(1983).
43. The Model Code does not recognize good motive or intent as a defense to violations of its Disciplinary Rules. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 412, 392 N.E.2d at 1342 (Moran,
J., dissenting); see also Greylord's Uneasy Fallout, supra note 1, at 36.
44. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 72 Ill. 2d 50, 377 N.E.2d 803 (1978); In re Howard, 69
I11.
2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1978); see also In re Friedman, 76 I11.
2d 392, 392 N.E.2d
1332 (1979).
Operation Greylord did not involve the federal courts, although the resulting prosecutions have been taking place in the federal courts. See Greylord's Uneasy Fallout,supra
note 1; Judge Who Wore a Wire, supra note 1. If Operation Greylord had included the
use of undercover techniques in a federal district courtroom the same Model Code provisions would have been at issue. See N.D. ILL. R. 3.54(b)(1984):
Plenary Proceedings. Any attorney authorized to practice before this Court
who has committed any act or acts of professional misconduct such as fraud,
deceit, malpractice, or failure to abide by the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association may be disbarred from
further practice before this Court.
Apparently, this rule does not distinguish between misconduct which occurs in state
courts and that which occurs in federal courts. Consequently, a lawyer who went unpun-
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disciplinary action should be taken against an attorney who used
undercover investigative techniques in the courtroom was first addressed in Illinois in the case of In re Friedman."
DISCUSSION

In re Friedman
In 1973, in separate situations, attorneys offered bribes to two
police officers. The officers consulted Morton E. Friedman, an assistant Cook County State's Attorney.46 On both occasions, Friedman counseled the officers to accept the bribes. Friedman's goal
was to obtain evidence for bribery prosecutions against both attorneys. Friedman
knew that his actions would involve deception of
47
court.
the
The first Friedman situation involved a defendant who was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.48
The defendant's attorney asked the arresting officer to arrange for
the absence of the breathalizer expert from court on the day of the
trial.4 9 Although the breathalizer expert was at the courthouse
during the trial and ready to testify, the officer falsely testified that
the expert was not present." As a result, the charges against the
defendant were dropped.5 1 Friedman informed the court of the deception immediately after it occurred.5 2 Meanwhile, outside of the
courtroom, the defendant's attorney paid the officer the bribe and
this attorney was later indicted for bribery. 3
In the second case, the defendant's attorney asked the officer
both to arrest a third-party complainant who filed battery charges
against the defendant and to threaten her with prosecution unless
ished for misconduct in a state court might still be disbarred from practicing before the
federal court of the Northern District of Illinois.
45. 76 111. 2d 392, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979). It has been noted that the Friedmancase
is as confusing as it is unique. See Greylord's Uneasy Fallout,supra note 1, at 35; Judge
Who Wore a Wire, supra note 1, at 76.
46. Friedman, 76 111. 2d at 393-94, 392 N.E.2d at 1333-34.
47. Id.
48. Id. A Cook County Circuit Court acquitted the defendant's attorney of criminal
bribery charges. He was, however, eventually disbarred as the result of disciplinary
charges filed against him by the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. See In re Howard, 69 Ill. 2d 343, 372 N.E.2d 371 (1978).
49. Friedman, 76 Il1. 2d at 394, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The actual payment of the bribe occurred in a washroom adjacent to the
courtroom. The attorney placed $50 into the officer's pocket and the officer handed the
attorney a grand jury subpoena. Howard, 69 Ill. 2d at 346-47, 372 N.E.2d at 372.
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she dropped the pending charges. 4 Again, Friedman directed the
officer to accept the bribe." If called as a witness at the preliminary hearing, the officer was to testify that the third-party com56
plainant was not in court and no longer wanted to press charges.
Friedman, prior to the hearing, led the complainant into the State's
5 7
Attorney's offices where she remained until the hearing was over.
The court required the officer to verify under oath that the complainant desired to drop the charges. 58 Again, the court was informed of the deception immediately after the hearing. 59 In his car
outside the courthouse, the defendant's attorney paid to the officer
6
the bribe and this attorney, too, was later indicted for bribery. 0
In 1976, the Administrator of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission filed a two-count complaint against Morton Friedman on the grounds that his conduct in deceiving the
court tended to bring the legal profession into disrepute and violated four Disciplinary Rules of the Model Code.6 ' Specifically,
the conduct was alleged to violate DR 1-102(A)(4), conduct involving dishonesty or deceit; DR 7-102(a)(4), use of perjured testimony; DR 7-102(A)(6), creation of false evidence; and DR 7109(B), secreting of witnesses. 62 The hearing board, the disciplinary equivalent of a trial court,63 found that Friedman's conduct
54. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 394, 392 N.E.2d at 1334. This attorney was subsequently
convicted of criminal bribery, unlike the attorney in Howard who was acquitted of the
same charge. See People v. Powell, 72 Ill. 2d 50, 377 N.E.2d 803 (1978).
55. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 394-95, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
56. Id. at 395, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. People v. Powell, 72 Ill. 2d 50, 377 N.E.2d 803 (1978).
61. Briefly, the Illinois disciplinary system works as follows: An inquiry board, after
receiving information of suspected misconduct by an attorney from a commission administrator, investigates the misconduct and decides whether a formal complaint should be
filed with the hearing board. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A 753(a) (1983). The hearing
board evaluates the evidence of misconduct, makes findings of fact and law, and determines whether the attorney should be disciplined. Id. 753(c). The review board then
reviews decisions made by the hearing board. Five of the nine members of the review
board must concur to reach a decision. Id. 753(d). A review board decision may be
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, although review is discretionary. Id. 753(e)(5),
(6).
In Friedman, the hearing board found no code violations. The administrator filed exceptions with the review board which, by a five-to-three majority, found that the code had
been violated and recommended censure. Friedman then appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 393, 392 N.E.2d at 1333.
62. See supra note 42.
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A 753(c) (1983).
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did not violate the Code.' The Administrator appealed to the review board 65 which made a contrary determination and decided to
censure Friedman.66 The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently
granted Friedman's petition for leave to appeal.
The Opinions of In re Friedman
In In re Friedman the petitioner, Friedman, admitted that his
conduct violated the express provisions of four Model Code sections. 67 Friedman, however, defended his conduct on two grounds.
First, Friedman analogized his conduct to the court-tolerated deceit used in narcotics investigations and from this analogy he concluded that "the courtroom is not immunized by the Code of
Professional Responsibility from investigation methods otherwise
lawful and ethical. ' 6 In his second argument, Friedman contended that the Model Code contained an implied good-motive defense or exception which excused technical violations of the Model
Code such as his.69
Six justices 70 participated in the Friedman decision and the case
consists of four separate opinions: the lead opinion by two justices; 71 a concurring opinion also by two justices; 72 and two dissenting opinions.7 3 The lead opinion stated that Friedman's conduct
violated the Model Code but that Friedman did not deserve to be
censured because he acted without the benefit of precedent or settled opinion. 74 The concurring justices joined the lead opinion
64. Friedman, 76 I11.
2d at 393, 392 N.E.2d at 1333.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A 753(d), (e) (1983).
66. Friedman, 76 I11.
2d at 393, 392 N.E.2d at 1333.
67. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 395, 392 N.E.2d at 1334; see supra note 42.
68. Friedman, 76 I11.
2d at 395-96, 392 N.E.2d at 1334.
69. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 396, 392 N.E.2d at 1334-35.
70. The seventh member of the court, Justice Ward, took no part in the consideration
or decision of the case. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339.
71. Chief Justice Goldenhersh authored the lead opinion, in which Justice Kluczynski joined. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 392, 392 N.E.2d at 1333.
72. Justice Underwood wrote the concurring opinion in which Justice Ryan joined.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 399, 392 N.E.2d at 1336 (Underwood and Ryan JJ., concurring).
73. The first dissent was written by Justice Clark. Friedman, 76 Ill.
2d at 406, 392
N.E.2d at 1339 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Moran wrote the second dissent. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 411, 392 N.E.2d at 1342 (Moran, J., dissenting).
74. In finding a Model Code violation, Chief Justice Goldenhersh stated: "The integrity of the courtroom is so vital to the health of our legal system that no violation, no
matter what its motivation, can be condoned." Friedman, 76 Ill.
2d at 398, 392 N.E.2d
at 1335. In support of the decision not to censure Friedman, Chief Justice Goldenhersh
stated: "Because respondent acted without the guidance of precedent or settled opinion
and because there is apparently considerable belief. . . that he acted properly in conducting the investigations, we conclude that no sanction should be imposed." Id. at 39899, 392 N.E.2d at 1336.
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only in their decision not to censure Friedman, and added that his
conduct did not violate the Model Code.75 In contrast, the dissenting justices found not only that Friedman's conduct violated the
Model Code but also that he should be censured.76
The lead opinion rejected Friedman's argument that his conduct
was analogous to court-tolerated deceit often employed in narcotics investigations. 7 These justices noted that the deceit used in
narcotics investigations occurs outside the courtroom and thus is
not subject to the Model Code as is the in-court deceit employed by
Friedman. 78 Moreover, the justices condemned Friedman's argument as one which used the ends to justify the means.79
The concurrence, joining the lead opinion only in the decision
not to censure, stated that the motive of the attorney employing
these techniques should be taken into account when determining
whether there were any Model Code violations.80 Because there
75. Justice Underwood stated in the concurrence: "while I do not join in the findings
of impropriety contained in the Chief Justice's [lead] opinion, I do join in discharging
respondent, rather than dismissing the complaint, so that we may have the constitutionally required concurrence of four members in the action to be taken (ILL. CONST. art. VI,
§ 3)." Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 399, 392 N.E.2d at 1336 (Underwood, J., concurring).
76. In his dissent, Justice Moran agreed with the reasoning of the lead opinion,
merely dissenting from the decision not to censure. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 411, 392
N.E.2d at 1342 (Moran, J., dissenting). Justice Clark, in his dissent, felt that Friedman's
conduct violated the Model Code, although his reasoning did not parallel the lead opinion's. Like Justice Moran, Justice Clark also felt that Friedman should be censured.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 407-08, 392 N.E.2d at 1340 (Clark, J., dissenting).
77. Friedman analogized his conduct to that employed by the law enforcement officers in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 395, 392
N.E.2d at 1334. Friedman argued that "the courtroom is not immunized by the Code of
Professional Responsibility from investigation methods otherwise lawful and ethical."
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 395-96, 392 N.E.2d at 1334. Friedman built on this argument by
proposing that his motive and intent should be taken into account and should negate any
technical violation of the Model Code. Id. at 396, 392 N.E.2d at 1334-35.
78. Justices Goldenhersh and Kluczynski, after noting that Friedman admitted that,
but for his motives, his actions would violate the Model Code, flatly rejected this argument. They emphatically stated: "even if no other ways existed to ferret out the bribery,
the respondent would still not be privileged to engage in unethical (and perhaps illegal)
conduct." Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 398, 392 N.E.2d at 1336.
79. Id. at 397, 392 N.E.2d at 1335. These justices quoted Justice Brandeis' famous
words from Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra note 33.
80. The concurring opinion suggested that a good-motive defense, to what otherwise
would be a Model Code violation, is implicitly included in the Model Code. Friedman,
76 111. 2d at 400, 392 N.E.2d at 1336 (Underwood and Ryan, JJ., concurring). In support
of this position, the opinion cites to a noted scholar in the field of professional responsibility, Monroe Freedman. "Motive is, of course, a primary consideration in making judgments regarding the ethical quality of conduct." M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN
AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 83 (1975). Both dissents noted that the Model Code does not
consider good motive or intent as a defense to a violation of the Disciplinary Rules. See
infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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was considerable evidence showing that Friedman's conduct was
guided by good motives, these justices decided that there were no
violations of the Model Code.81
The first dissent, which found that Friedman's conduct violated
the Model Code, felt that even temporary deception of a court was
impermissible.8 2 While both dissents rejected the concurring opinion's reasoning that motive should be taken into account,8 3 the first
dissent noted that Friedman could have avoided deceiving the
court, and therefore violating the Model Code, by informing the
court of the planned deception ahead of time. 4 The second dissent
agreed completely with the reasoning of the lead opinion, dissenting only from the decision not to censure Friedman."5
The Greylord Guidelines
Until Friedman, no case had dealt with the issue of whether incourt undercover techniques could be justified when employed in
81. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 405, 392 N.E.2d at 1339 (Underwood and Ryan, JJ.,
concurring). The concurring justices also expressed fear that by holding Friedman's conduct to be in violation of the Model Code, all corrupt lawyers would be immune from
investigation and prosecution. Id. at 404-05, 392 N.E.2d at 1338-39 (Underwood and
Ryan, JJ., concurring).
82. Justice Clark stated: "It is not within the province of any attorney, including one
who represents the State, to determine whether the public interest requires the temporary
deception of the court." Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 407, 392 N.E.2d at 1340 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
83. Justice Clark noted that there are no exemptions from the Model Code for good
intent or motive and that deception of a court, even if a prosecutor's statutory duties
authorize him to use deception, is impermissible. Id. at 411-12, 392 N.E.2d at 1340
(Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Moran explicitly stated "[tihat respondent might be excused because his motives were pure is an untenable defense, particularly when intent is
not an element of the charge here raised against him." Id. at 412, 392 N.E.2d at 1342
(Moran, J., dissenting).
84. The concluding paragraph of Justice Clark's dissent illustrates how he thinks
Model Code violations can be avoided:
Finally, even if the respondent had in good faith believed that, for some as yet
unarticulated reason, he could not talk to the trial judge, he should not have
taken it upon himself to decide whether the temporary deception of the trial
judge was appropriate. He should have had the common sense and ethical circumspection to have brought his dilemma to the attention of the presiding judge
of the criminal division, or the chief judge of the circuit court, or if the foregoing were for some reason inappropriate, to this court itself, which has supervisory powers over the circuit courts. He did not do so; he thus usurped the role
of the courts through deceiving a trial judge, albeit temporarily, and his conduct
merits censure.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 411, 392 N.E.2d at 1342 (Clark, J., dissenting).
85. In a short dissent, Justice Moran agreed with the rationale of the lead opinion,
disagreed strongly with the concurrence, and generally condemned Friedman's conduct.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 411-13, 392 N.E.2d at 1342-43 (Moran, J., dissenting).
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an official investigation.8 6 As a result of Friedman, in which a majority of the court decided that this type of conduct violated the
Model Code,87 the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois developed six protective guidelines.88 The U.S. Attorney
faced an investigation of serious corruption in the judiciary without precedent to guide him. He believed that undercover government attorneys acting within the strictures of these guidelines,
would not violate the Model Code and would avoid the problems
addressed in Friedman.s9
The six guidelines developed by the U.S. Attorney's office can be
labelled Necessity, Targeting, Case Selection, Supervision, Minimization, and Notification. 90 With the exception of Notification,
these guidelines appear to be drawn from the findings made by the
hearing board, which findings were reproduced in full in the concurring opinion in Friedman.9 ' The Notification guideline addresses problems raised by Justice Clark in his dissent in
Friedman.92 Apparently, neither the lead opinion nor the remaining dissent are directly addressed or represented in the guidelines. 93
The first guideline, Necessity, provides that Friedman-type deception can only be used if absolutely required. It may be employed only if there is no feasible alternative method for obtaining
the evidence necessary to prosecute. 94 This first guideline is apparently drawn from the finding of the hearing board which noted that
Friedman had no alternative way of obtaining evidence adequate to
86. See supra note 45.
87. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text; see also Sullivan Lecture, supra
note 11, at 437.
88. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
89. Mr. Sullivan stated in his lecture that "I have isolated six standards which I think
must be met if this kind of investigation is to adhere to the Code of Professional Responsibility and satisfy the problems raised by the majority of justices in the Friedman case."
Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 439.
90. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 439-440.
91. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. The complete findings of the
hearing board are reproduced in the concurring opinion. Friedman,76 Ill. 2d at 401-03,
392 N.E.2d at 1337-38 (Underwood and Ryan, JJ., concurring). The hearing board held
that Friedman's conduct did not violate the Model Code. This holding was subsequently
overturned by the review board. See supra note 61.
92. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text; see also supra note 85.
93. The lead opinion and Justice Moran's dissent, which agreed with the reasoning of
the lead opinion, would probably not accept the guidelines because these justices are unlikely to allow Friedman-type deception. See supra notes 78 & 85 and accompanying
text.
94. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 439.
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prove the guilt of the corrupt attorneys. 95
The second guideline, Targeting, requires that Friedman-type
deception be used only when investigating individuals against
whom considerable evidence of criminal activity has already been
obtained.96 This guideline is also apparently based upon the finding of the hearing board which noted that the attorneys in the
Friedman investigations had not been randomly chosen and entrapped by Friedman, but rather, had been targeted only after they
had initiated the bribery schemes. 97
The third guideline is Case Selection. The cases in which Fried95. Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 401-02, 392 N.E.2d at 1337 (Underwood and Ryan, JJ.,
concurring).
Bennett Gershman of Pace University, who has also proposed a series of guidelines to
control the use of undercover techniques, which unlike the Greylord guidelines do not
focus on the courtroom but would apply to the use of these techniques generally, included
as one of his six guidelines "The Necessity for the Operation." Gershman, supra note 14,
at 616-19. Gershman states that: "If the investigative procedure is not necessary to
achieve legitimate law enforcement goals, its use may not be a proper exercise of government power, particularly if the deceptive techniques invade the privacy of the individual
under investigation." Id. at 616. It should be noted that Gershman's guidelines derive
from and try to give effect to the Supreme Court's due process analysis set out in United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. See
generally Gershman, supra note 14.
The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes also deals with the necessity of
using undercover-type techniques before an investigation has begun.
Before employing an investigative technique in an inquiry, the FBI should
consider whether the information could be obtained in a timely and effective
way by less intrusive means. Some of the factors to be considered in judging
intrusiveness are adverse consequences to an individual's privacy interests and
avoidable damage to his reputation. Whether an intrusive technique should be
used in an inquiry depends on the seriousness of the possible crime and the
strength of the information indicating the possible existence of the crime.
Elliff, The Attorney General's Guidelinesfor FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
785, 806 (1984) (quoting The Attorney General's Guidelines on Racketeering Enterprise
and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations (Mar. 7, 1983), issued as Department of
Justice Press Release, Mar. 7, 1983, § II.B.4 [hereinafter cited as "Attorney General's
Guidelines"].) One scholar recently developed an analysis to be applied in order to justify the use of undercover techniques. The analysis characterizes six dimensions which
determine whether the techniques are too intrusive when balanced against civil liberty
and due process concerns. The dimensions are:
(1) the extensiveness of the [investigation]. . .; (2) the intensiveness of the [investigation] . . .; (3) whether the focus [of the investigation] is on persons or
on time, place and activity; (4) the covertness or deceptiveness of the information gathering; (5) the size and character of inducements offered to witnesses or
victims of offenses; and (6) the government's role in instigating or facilitating
the offense.
Moore, Invisible Offenses: A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law Enforcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 31, at 17, 28.
96. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 439.
97. The following is a quotation of the relevant portion of the hearing board's fourth
paragraph:
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man-type deception is used must be contrived carefully to avoid
undue risk of harm to third parties. 98 This guideline is drawn from

the hearing board's findings that Friedman's conduct did not prejudice or injure the court, the people of Illinois, or the defendants. 99
There was no practical alternative method available to the State's Attorney's
office to obtain the type of evidence (the payment of money) which experience
had shown was indispensable in order to prove the guilt of corrupt attorneys.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 401-02, 392 N.E.2d at 1337 (Underwood and Ryan, JJ., concurring).
The problems related to target selection are discussed at great length in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 31; see Sherman, From Whodunit to Who Does It: Fairnessand Target
Selection In Deceptive Investigations,in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 31, at 118; see also
Marx, Who Really Gets Strung? Some Issues Raised by the New Police Undercover Work,
28 CRIME & DELINQ. 165 (1982), reprinted in ABSCAM ETHICS, supra note 31, at 65.
Gershman also addresses the targeting problem under his guideline entitled "Factual Justification." He states:
If the government bases its undercover investigation on facts indicating present
criminal activity, or suggesting that a particular individual is about to commit a
crime, the government is not overreaching in affirmatively soliciting particular
groups or individuals; there is no danger of arbitrary prosecution. If the government bases its investigation on facts that indicate that official corruption exists, but that fail to identify particular individuals, the government does not
violate due process as long as it does not actively target any particular person.
Gershman, supra note 14, at 612-13.
With regard to what is required to initiate an investigation against an individual, the
Attorney General's Guidelines provide that the standard to be used is "reasonable
indication":
The standard of "reasonable indication" is substantially lower than probable
cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of a federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumstances
that a prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require
specific facts or circumstances indicating a past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a
mere hunch is insufficient.
Elliff, supra note 95, at 799, (quoting Attorney General's Guidelines, supra note 95, at

§ II.C.I.)
In light of the preceding quotation, consider FBI Director William Webster's comment
on the Abscam investigation: "We're only investigating people who we have reason to
believe are engaged or would like to engage in a crime." Washington Post, March 22,
1982, at A2 (emphasis added); see also Select Committee on Undercover Activities, supra
note 35, at 56-77.
98. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 439.
99. The first paragraph of the hearing board's findings states:
Respondent did not entrap or attempt to entrap attorneys Powell and Howard. On the contrary, attorneys Powell and Howard initiated and were responsible for the bribery scheme.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 401, 392 N.E.2d at 1337.
What Mr. Sullivan calls "Case Selection" is addressed in part in two of Gershman's
guidelines. The first, entitled "Societal Harm," addresses the use of fictitious court
proceedings:
The use of fictitious court proceedings and the grand jury to establish the
credentials of undercover agents in preparation for the exposure of corruption
does not . . . appear inherently evil or improper. The staged arrest undoubt-
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The fourth guideline, Supervision, requires that cases which involve Friedman-type deception should be closely and carefully
monitored. Freedom of action by all those involved in the deception should be kept to a minimum.I°° The source of this guideline
is apparently the hearing board's finding that it was Friedman himself, and not the police officers, who supervised the gathering of the
evidence against the attorneys and who determined the nature and
extent of the false testimony and the unavailability of witnesses.10 '
The fifth guideline is Minimization. This guideline states that
Friedman-type deception must be kept to a minimum; once a provable case is made against an individual, the investigation against
that individual must cease. °2 Although this guideline does not appear to be drawn directly from any of the hearing board's findings,
it is a natural extension of the protections afforded by the first three
edly affects the publicly perceived integrity or impartiality of the system...
[b]ut one must balance this nebulous harm against the benefits derived from
eradicating misconduct from that system.
Gershman, supra note 14, at 628.
The second Gershman guideline that resembles "case selection" is entitled "Violation
of Individual Rights." This guideline concerns the risk of harm to third parties:
A difficult question arises, however, if the undercover activity invades the rights
of a third party, not the rights of the defendant. Ordinarily, rights are personal,
and only the person aggrieved may claim a violation of those rights. The government's violation of the rights of a third party, however, ought to be a relevant consideration in assessing, under due process, the overall fairness of the
investigative conduct.
Id. at 629.
100. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 440.
101. The third paragraph of the hearing board's findings states:
A responsible attorney in the State's Attorney's office supervised the gathering of the evidence against attorneys Powell and Howard. No free rein was
given to police officers or laymen to determine what testimony would be given
in court, what witnesses would be made available, or what other steps would be
taken in court in order to gather evidence against attorneys Howard and
Powell.
Friedman, 76 I11.2d at 401. 392 N.E.2d at 1337.
While none of Gershman's guidelines deal directly with supervision, it is an end at
which his guidelines aim. The Gersham guidelines are designed as criteria to be met
prior to the issuance of what Gershman describes as a special search warrant which allows the use of undercover techniques.
If government officials routinely applied for staged arrest warrants that set
out their factual predicate, their investigative alternatives, the details of the
manufactured crime and its predicted progression through the judicial system,
their solicitation methods, and their predicted involvement in the crime under
investigation, the warrants would mitigate the abuses to which staged arrests
are prone.
Greshman, supra note 14, at 634-35.
See also Select Committee on Undercover Activities, supra note 35, at 30-31.
102. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 440.
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all limit the
guidelines. Necessity, Targeting, and Case Selection
10 3
possible harm caused by Friedman-type deception.
The sixth guideline, Notification, requires that persons in authority in the judicial and law enforcement branches be informed
of the investigation, including the intended use of Friedman-type
deception."°4 This guideline addresses the problems concerning
Friedman's conduct expressed by Justice Clark in his dissent. According to Justice Clark, Friedman would not have violated the
Model Code if he had notified in advance the presiding judge of the
criminal division or the chief judge of the circuit court of his
activities.105
ANALYSIS

The U.S. Attorney's Office formulated its guidelines"°6 after concluding that, under Friedman, undercover techniques may be used
in the courtroom if certain precautions are taken. 107 This conclu103. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
Gershman includes the Greylord guideline of Notification within his "Minimization of
Harm" guideline. One way of minimizing the harm caused by a staged arrest is to limit
the deception by informing those in authority of the investigation. Gershman, supra note
14, at 632.
The fifth paragraph of the hearing board's findings is reproduced below along with the
sixth paragraph to which the fifth paragraph makes reference:
5. Respondent's conduct did not deceive, prejudice or injure the Court, the
People, or the defendants in the two cases. The respective courts were not
deceived because of the prompt action taken by Respondent set forth in paragraph 6.
6. The Respondent made a prompt disclosure of the true facts to the court
after the dismissal of each case, and thus allowed the judge to act promptly in
the event the judge felt that the Respondent's conduct had been contemptuous
or that any other action should be taken under the circumstances.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 402, 392 N.E.2d at 1337.
Gershman's sixth guideline, entitled "Minimization of Harm," is almost the mirror
image of Sullivan's Minimization guideline. The only difference is that Gershman's is
directed towards preventing due process violations, and the Greylord guideline is directed
towards preventing Model Code violations. Gershman states:
In evaluating whether the government violated due process, one should consider its attempts to limit harmful consequences to societal and to individual
rights, because such attempts shed light on the fairness of the procedure and the
motives of the government agency.
Gershman, supra note 14, at 631.
104. Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 440.
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
107. Mr. Sullivan stated in his lecture:
When the investigation involves the court system, as this [Greylord] did, unique
problems are involved because the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits
misleading the Court, submitting perjured testimony or false evidence.
And the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled on that subject in the case of In re
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sion, however, does not seem to be warranted by the Friedmancase
because four justices decided that Friedman's conduct violated the
Model Code.108 Moreover, three of these justices would never allow the use of undercover techniques in the courtroom regardless
of how necessary these methods were and what precautions were
taken.' 019 Consequently, because the guidelines could not garner
the support of a majority of the Friedmanjustices, they in all likelihood will fail to prevent Model Code violations when undercover
techniques are employed in the courtroom. 10
The guidelines would be able to garner the support of a majority
of the Friedmanjustices only if the Model Code contained an implied good-motive exception for apparent Model Code violations
such as Friedman's."'I Otherwise, Friedman's conduct and similar
conduct technically violates the express provisions of the four
noted Model Code sections. 1' 2 However, only the two concurring
justices interpreted the Model Code as containing an implied goodmotive exception; I the other four justices rejected this interpretation and, consequently, decided that Friedman violated the Model
Code. 4
Of the four justices who rejected the good-motive exception only
Justice Clark might be persuaded to allow the use of undercover
techniques in the courtroom.' 15 Justice Clark reasoned that if the
court were informed in advance of the planned use of undercover
techniques, the deception which the Model Code was intended to
Morton Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392, a case that was decided in 1979 while this
matter was under consideration and review in the United States Attorney's
office.
Sullivan Lecture, supra note 11, at 14, lines 7-16. Mr. Sullivan also indicated that, by
using his guidelines, the difficulties expressed by the justices in Friedman can be solved so
that undercover techniques could be used in court without violating the Model Code. See
supra note 89.
108. See supra notes 77-79 & 82-85 and accompanying text.
109. These justices include Chief Justice Goldenhersh, Justice Kluczynski, and Justice Moran. See supra notes 77-79 & 85 and accompanying text. See also infra note 118.
110. The Illinois Supreme Court follows the practice of the United States Supreme
Court when there is no quorum majority in favor of a particular disposition by affirming
the decision of the lower court without giving it precedential value. Perlman v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 60 Ill. 2d 529, 530, 331 N.E.2d 65, 66 (1975).
Illinois disciplinary cases do have precedential weight, but the specific discipline to be
imposed in each case must be judged individually, based on the circumstances involved.
In re Kien, 69 Ill. 2d 355, 360-62, 372, 362 N.E.2d 378-79, (1977); In re Howard, 69 Ill.
2d 343, 354, 372 N.E.2d 371, 375 (1978).
111. See supra notes 80 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 77-79 & 82-85 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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prevent would be eliminated." 6 There could be, therefore, no code
violation. 7 The sixth Greylord guideline, Notification, seems to
address this problem adequately." 8
Even if Friedman had the effect of binding precedent on the issue
of whether undercover techniques could ever be used in the courtroom,' 1 9 the Greylord guidelines still could not claim the support
of a majority of the justices for the proposition that these techniques could be used. 120 The guidelines might garner the support of
three justices, but would need 2the support of four to effectively prevent Model Code violations.' '
Moreover, since Friedman does not have the effect of binding
precedent, the Friedmanjustices are not bound by the views which
they expressed in that case. 122 While these views offer guidance as
to how the court would decide whether undercover techniques
could ever be used in the courtroom without violating the Model
Code, reliance solely upon these views may be imprudent if it is to
continue over an extended period of time. The possibility that the
judges' views of the issue will change, combined with the inevitability that the composition of the court will change over time, creates
uncertainty as to whether123a future Friedman-type case would be
decided in the same way.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
Mr. Sullivan stated in his lecture that high ranking members of the judiciary must be
informed of the investigation and the planned use of Friedman-type deception. Sullivan
Lecture, supra note 11, at 00. The chief judge of the United States district court in Chicago and the chief judge of the criminal court in Cook County were notified of the Greylord investigations. Id. at 00. The Notification guideline easily satisfies Justice Clark's
difficulties with Friedman's conduct: "He [Friedman] should have had the common
sense and ethical circumspection to have brought his dilemma to the attention of the
presiding judge of the criminal division, or the chief judge of the circuit court.
Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d at 411, 392 N.E.2d at 1342 (Clark, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 74-85 and accompanying text. The concurring opinion, which
contains the views of Justices Underwood and Ryan, joined the lead opinion only in the
decision not to censure Friedman. Thus, the votes of the four justices who decided that
Friedman's conduct violated the Model Code were split between the lead opinion and the
two dissents. Id.
120. Id.
121. Since the Notification guidelines seems to satisfy the problems raised by Justice
Clark's dissent, he can be counted along with the two concurring justices as allowing the
use of undercover techniques in the courtroom. See supra notes 75, 84, & 104-05 and
accompanying text.
122. See supra note 110.
123. At the time of this writing, two Friedmanjustices, Justices Kluczynski and Underwood, are no longer with the court.
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IMPACT AND ALTERNATIVES

The Greylord guidelines would probably be of great use in the
legislative process. They could become part of a good-motive exception amendment to the Model Code. The protections and controls which they provide over the use of undercover techniques
would probably have to be part of such an amendment in order to
insure its passage.' 24 In fact, because of attention which the use of
undercover techniques has drawn recently, 25 the passage of a
good-motive exception amendment would be highly improbable
without some guaranteed safeguards against the misuse of undercover techniques.
The Greylord Guidelines could perform this safeguarding function admirably. Indeed, the guidelines compare very favorably
with other measures which have been proposed for controlling the
use of undercover techniques. 26 The United States Senate is currently considering protective measures consisting both of statutory
provisions and proposed guidelines to control the federal use of
undercover techniques.127 These measures seek to strike a balance
between the tyranny of unchecked crime and the tyranny of unchecked government intrusion. 28 Even more recently, a noted
scholar drafted for legislative consideration guidelines aimed29at the
same purpose and very similar to the Greylord guidelines.
While this note has criticized the effectiveness of the Greylord
guidelines, it does not intend to question what is perhaps the underlying premise-that undercover techniques in the courtroom
are necessary for effective law enforcement. Indeed, this note recommends a good-motive exception amendment to the Model Code
which includes the Greylord guidelines or similar protective
measures.
CONCLUSION

The recent Operation Greylord Investigation evidenced the need
to employ undercover techniques in the courtroom. At present,
however, the use of these techniques in the courtroom technically
violates various provisions of the Model Code of Professional Re124. The criticism which the uncontrolled use of undercover techniques has caused
would in all likelihood prevent the passage of such an amendment without guaranteed
safeguards. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 35.
128. Id.
129. See Gershman, supra notes 14 & 94-105.
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sponsibility. In order to avoid these violations a good-motive exception must be added to the Illinois Code.
Although the Greylord guidelines do not succeed in preventing
Model Code violations when undercover techniques are used in the
courtroom as intended, these guidelines still could make a valuable
contribution to the passage of a good-motive exception amendment. The guidelines would provide the safeguards against the
misuse of these techniques and which must accompany such an
amendment in order to insure its passage.
ANDREW MAJESKE

